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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Renee M. Smith, a pro se litigant, appeals from the 
district court's order of May 21, 1997, dismissing her 
complaint for failure to state a claim, and from the district 
court's order of June 5, 1997, denying her motion for leave 
to amend her complaint. Smith's complaint alleges 
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1, 
and Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 
U.S.C. S 1681, as well as a state law breach of contract 
claim against the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
("NCAA"). Smith's allegations arise from the NCAA's 
promulgation and enforcement of a bylaw prohibiting a 
student-athlete from participating in intercollegiate 
athletics while enrolled in a graduate program at an 
institution other than the student-athlete's undergraduate 
institution. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction over the federal claims 
in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1337 and 
15 U.S.C. S 15, and over the state law claim pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1367. This court has jurisdiction to review the final 
orders of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. According to the NCAA rules, a student-athlete is eligible to 
participate 
in intercollegiate athletics for a total of four seasons within a five-
year 
period. Because Smith's five year-period of eligibility has expired and, 
according to the NCAA her complaint seeks only declaratory relief, the 
NCAA concludes that her Title IX claim is moot. We disagree. 
 
Smith's Title IX claim is not moot although her period of eligibility has 
expired because she retains a claim for damages. See Ellis Bhd. of Ry., 
Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 442, 104 S.Ct. 1883, 1889 (1984) 
(holding that a claim is not moot where there is a viable damages claim); 
National Iranian Oil Co. v. MAPCO Int'l, Inc., 983 F.2d 485, 489 (3d Cir. 
1992); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. New Jersey, 772 F.2d 35, 41 
(3d Cir. 1985). Although count II of Smith's complaint, which asserts a 
Title IX claim, states that "[t]his action is a request for a declaratory 
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We exercise plenary review over the district court's 
dismissal of Smith's complaint for failure to state a claim. 
See Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 684 (3d Cir. 1997). We 
accept all of her allegations as true, view them in the light 
most favorable to her, and will affirm the dismissal only if 
she can prove no set of facts entitling her to relief. See 
Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996); ALA, Inc. v. 
CCAir, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994). We review the 
district court's denial of her motion for leave to amend her 
complaint for abuse of discretion. See In re Burlington Coat 
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Smith graduated from high school in the spring of 1991 
and enrolled in St. Bonaventure University the following 
fall, where she participated in Division I athletics. Smith 
played intercollegiate volleyball for St. Bonaventure during 
the 1991-92 and 1992-93 athletic seasons. By her choice, 
Smith did not participate in intercollegiate volleyball for St. 
Bonaventure during the 1993-94 season. 
 
Smith graduated from St. Bonaventure in two and one 
half years. Thereafter, she enrolled in a postbaccalaureate 
program at Hofstra, and then in 1995 she enrolled in a 
second postbaccalaureate program at the University of 
Pittsburgh. St. Bonaventure did not offer either of these 
postbaccalaureate programs. 
 
The NCAA is an unincorporated association comprised of 
public and private colleges and universities and is 
responsible for promulgating rules governing all aspects of 
intercollegiate athletics, including recruiting, eligibility of 
student-athletes, and academic standards. The member 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
relief challenging sex discriminatory practices and policies of the NCAA 
. . . in violation of Title IX," her complaint also includes a clause 
which 
prays for additional relief including damages and any further relief which 
the court finds appropriate. App. at 5. In our view, a fair reading of the 
complaint establishes that it asserts an action for damages under Title 
IX. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 112 S.Ct. 
1028 (1992) (holding that a claim for damages exists in an action to 
enforce Title IX). 
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institutions agree to abide by and enforce these rules. The 
NCAA denied Smith eligibility to compete for Hofstra and 
the University of Pittsburgh in the 1994-95 and 1995-96 
athletic seasons, respectively, based upon Bylaw 14.1.8.2 in 
the NCAA Manual (the "Postbaccalaureate Bylaw"). The 
Postbaccalaureate Bylaw provides that a student-athlete 
may not participate in intercollegiate athletics at a 
postgraduate institution other than the institution from 
which the student earned her undergraduate degree. 2 Both 
Hofstra and the University of Pittsburgh applied to the 
NCAA for a waiver of the bylaw with respect to Smith, but 
the NCAA denied both requests. Smith was, however, in 
good academic standing and in compliance with all other 
NCAA eligibility requirements for the 1994-95 and 1995-96 
athletic seasons. 
 
In August 1996, Smith instituted this suit challenging 
the NCAA's enforcement of the bylaw as well as the NCAA's 
refusal to waive the bylaw in her case. More particularly, 
Smith alleged that the Postbaccalaureate Bylaw is an 
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of 
the Sherman Act and the NCAA's refusal to waive the bylaw 
excluded her from intercollegiate competition based upon 
her sex in violation of Title IX. Smith also asserted a state 
law breach of contract claim based upon the NCAA's denial 
of eligibility. On May 21, 1997, the district court dismissed 
Smith's federal claims for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted. The court held that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The bylaw at issue provides that 
 
       [a] student-athlete who is enrolled in a graduate or professional 
       school of the institution he or she previously attended as an 
       undergraduate (regardless of whether the individual has received a 
       United States baccalaureate degree or its equivalent), a student- 
       athlete who is enrolled and seeking a second baccalaureate or 
       equivalent degree at the same institution, or a student-athlete who 
       has graduated and is continuing as a full-time student at the same 
       institution while taking course work that would lead to the 
       equivalent of another major or degree as defined and documented by 
       the institution, may participate in intercollegiate athletics, 
provided 
       the student has eligibility remaining and such participation occurs 
       within the applicable five-year or 10-semester period . . . . 
 
Rule 14.1.8.2 of NCAA Manual. 
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NCAA's refusal to waive the bylaw was not the type of 
action to which the Sherman Act applied. It also held that 
Smith's complaint did not allege adequately that the NCAA 
was a recipient of federal funding so as to be subject to 
Title IX. By the same order, the district court exercised its 
discretion to dismiss Smith's state law contract claim 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c). See Smith v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 978 F. Supp. 213 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 
Thereafter, Smith submitted a proposed amended 
complaint and moved the district court for leave to amend 
her complaint, which the district court denied "as moot" on 
June 5, 1997. Smith filed timely appeals from these orders, 
which we have consolidated. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. SHERMAN ACT CLAIM 
 
Count I of Smith's complaint alleges that the NCAA, in 
promulgating and enforcing the Postbaccalaureate Bylaw, 
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act because the bylaw 
unreasonably restrains trade and has an adverse 
anticompetitive effect. As we have indicated, the district 
court dismissed this claim for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted, holding that "the actions of 
the NCAA in refusing to waive the Postbaccalaureate Bylaw 
and allow the Plaintiff to participate in intercollegiate 
athletics is not the type of action to which the Sherman Act 
was meant to be applied." See Smith, 978 F. Supp. at 218. 
Smith argues that the district court erred in limiting the 
application of the Sherman Act to the NCAA's commercial 
and business activities. We disagree. 
 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides, in relevant part, 
that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. S 1. Although the section 
literally prohibits "every" contract, section 1 does not 
preclude all restraints on trade, but only those that are 
unreasonable. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. 
Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 & 
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n.17, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 2959 & n.17 (1984); Arizona v. 
Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-44, 102 
S.Ct. 2466, 2472-73 (1982). The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
SS 15, 26, grants a private right of action to, inter alia, a 
person "injured in his business or property" by a violation 
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 
 
Smith misconstrues the law in arguing that the Supreme 
Court has refused to limit antitrust remedies to commercial 
interests. The cases she cites address whether the plaintiffs 
alleged injuries within the meaning of the Clayton Act; in 
that context, the Court held that the statute was not 
limited to redressing injuries to commercial interests. See 
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-89, 99 S.Ct. 
2326, 2330 (1979) (holding that "injury to business or 
property" was not limited to commercial interests); Blue 
Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473, 102 S.Ct. 
2540, 2545 (1982) (holding that a subscriber to a health 
plan who had employed the services of a psychologist 
alleged a redressable antitrust injury); see also McNulty v. 
Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1115-18 (E.D. Pa. 1979) 
(holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator 
was injured in his business or property). The question 
which we now face is different; it is whether antitrust laws 
apply only to the alleged infringer's commercial activities. 
Thus, rather than focus on Smith's alleged injuries, we 
consider the character of the NCAA's activities. 
 
In this regard, we recognize that the Supreme Court has 
suggested that antitrust laws are limited in their 
application to commercial and business endeavors. Thus, 
the Court has explained that 
 
       [the Sherman Act] was enacted in the era of`trusts' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides: 
 
       [A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by 
       reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor 
       in any district court of the United States . . . without respect to 
the 
       amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by 
       him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable 
       attorney's fee. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 15. 
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       and of `combinations' of businesses and of capital 
       organized and directed to control of the market by 
       suppression of competition in the marketing of goods 
       and services, the monopolistic tendency of which had 
       become a matter of public concern. The end sought (by 
       these laws) was the prevention of the restraints to the 
       competition in business and commercial transactions 
       which tended to restrict production, raise prices or 
       otherwise control the market to the detriment of 
       purchasers or consumers of goods and services, all of 
       which had come to be regarded as a special form of 
       public injury. 
 
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492-93, 60 S.Ct. 
982, 992 (1940). The Court also has noted that "in Apex [it] 
recognized that the Act is aimed primarily at combinations 
having commercial objectives and is applied only to a very 
limited extent to organizations . . . which normally have 
other objectives." Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 
359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7, 79 S.Ct. 705, 710 n.7 (1959). 
 
The Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the 
Sherman Act to the NCAA in National Collegiate Athletic 
Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 
holding that the NCAA's plan to restrict television coverage 
of intercollegiate football games violated section 1. The 
Court discussed the procompetitive nature of the NCAA's 
activities such as establishing eligibility requirements as 
opposed to the anticompetitive nature of the television plan. 
See id. at 117, 104 S.Ct. at 2969. Yet, while the Court 
distinguished the NCAA's television plan from its rule 
making, it did not comment directly on whether the 
Sherman Act would apply to the latter. 
 
Although insofar as we are aware no court of appeals 
expressly has addressed the issue of whether antitrust laws 
apply to the NCAA's promulgation of eligibility rules, cf. 
McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 
1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988) (assuming without deciding that 
the NCAA's eligibility rules were subject to antitrust 
scrutiny and holding that the "no-draft" and "no-agent" 
rules do not have an anticompetitive effect), many district 
courts have held that the Sherman Act does not apply to 
the NCAA's promulgation and enforcement of eligibility 
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requirements. See Gaines v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744-46 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) 
(holding that antitrust law cannot be used to invalidate 
NCAA eligibility rules, but noting in dicta that the"no- 
agent" and "no-draft" rules have primarily procompetitive 
effects); Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. 
Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975) (holding that antitrust law 
does not apply to NCAA eligibility rules); College Athletic 
Placement Servs., Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 
1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 60,117, available in 1974 WL 
998, *2, *3 (D.N.J. 1974) (holding that the NCAA's adoption 
of a rule furthering its noncommercial objectives, such as 
preserving the educational standards of its members, is not 
within the purview of antitrust law), aff'd , 506 F.2d 1050 
(3d Cir. 1974) (table). 
 
We agree with these courts that the eligibility rules are 
not related to the NCAA's commercial or business activities. 
Rather than intending to provide the NCAA with a 
commercial advantage, the eligibility rules primarily seek to 
ensure fair competition in intercollegiate athletics. Based 
upon the Supreme Court's recognition that the Sherman 
Act primarily was intended to prevent unreasonable 
restraints in "business and commercial transactions," Apex, 
310 U.S. at 493, 60 S.Ct. at 992, and therefore has only 
limited applicability to organizations which have principally 
noncommercial objectives, see Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. at 214 
n.7, 79 S.Ct. at 710 n.7, we find that the Sherman Act does 
not apply to the NCAA's promulgation of eligibility  
requirements.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 
Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 96-3034, 1998 WL 23710 
(10th Cir. Jan. 23, 1998), does not alter our result. At issue in Law was 
the NCAA's bylaw restricting entry-level coaches' annual compensation. 
The court held that although the restriction was a horizontal price 
restraint, which is usually per se invalid, the rule of reason applied 
because certain products, such as intercollegiate sports, require 
horizontal restraints in order to exist. See id. at *5-*6 (citing National 
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100-01, 104 
S.Ct. at 2959-60). 
 
The bylaw at issue in Law concerned a restriction on the business 
activities of the institutions, whereas the Postbaccalaureate Bylaw does 
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Moreover, even if the NCAA's actions in establishing 
eligibility requirements were subject to the Sherman Act, 
we would affirm the district court's dismissal of this claim. 
The NCAA's eligibility requirements are not "plainly 
anticompetitive," National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 679, 692, 98 S.Ct. 1355, 1365 (1978), and 
therefore are not per se unreasonable, see National 
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 
101, 104 S.Ct. at 2960 (refusing to apply per se rule to 
NCAA's television plan because the NCAA is involved in an 
industry where horizontal restraints are necessary to the 
availability of the product); McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343- 
44; College Athletic Placement Servs., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) P 60,117, available in 1974 WL 998, *3. 
Consequently, if the eligibility requirements were subject to 
the Sherman Act, we would analyze them under the rule of 
reason. 
 
Under the "rule of reason" test, a court considers all 
relevant factors in determining a defendant's purpose in 
implementing the challenged restraint and the effect of the 
restraint on competition, see Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film 
Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1367-68 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Board 
of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238, 38 
S.Ct. 242, 243-44 (1918)), and asks essentially whether the 
challenged rule promotes or hinders competition. See 
McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1344. 
 
As noted above, the Supreme Court has recognized the 
procompetitive nature of many of the NCAA's restraints, 
including eligibility requirements. See National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117, 104 
S.Ct. at 2969. According to the Supreme Court, 
 
       [w]hat the NCAA and its member institutions market in 
       this case is competition itself--contests between 
       competing institutions. Of course, this would be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
not. Because our analysis regarding the applicability of the Sherman Act 
focuses on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
activities, Law is inapposite. Further, because of the significant 
difference in the nature of the bylaw at issue in Law and the 
Postbaccalaureate Bylaw, the Law court's rule of reason analysis is not 
instructive here. 
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       completely ineffective if there were no rules on which 
       the competitors agreed to create and define the 
       competition to be marketed. A myriad of rules . . . 
       must be agreed upon, and all restrain the manner in 
       which institutions compete. . . . Thus, the NCAA plays 
       a vital role in enabling [intercollegiate sports] to 
       preserve its character, and as a result enables a 
       product to be marketed which might otherwise be 
       unavailable. In performing this role, its actions widen 
       consumer choice . . . and hence can be viewed as 
       procompetitive. 
 
Id. at 101-02, 104 S.Ct. at 2960-61 (footnote omitted). In 
particular, the Court explained that "[i]t is reasonable to 
assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA 
are justifiable means of fostering competition among 
amateur athletic teams and therefore procompetitive 
because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate 
athletics" and suggested that rules establishing eligibility 
requirements of student-athletes were such controls, while 
rules limiting television broadcasts were not. See id. at 117, 
104 S.Ct. at 2969. 
 
While the parties have not cited any opinion addressing 
the particular bylaw at issue here, and we have found 
none, other courts have held that the NCAA's "no-draft" 
and "no-agent" rules, which disqualify a student-athlete 
from further intercollegiate competition if the student- 
athlete enters a professional draft or contacts an agent, are 
reasonable because they are procompetitive. See 
McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343; Banks v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass'n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1087-94 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that NCAA's "no-draft" and "no-agent" rules do not 
have an anticompetitive impact on a discernable market); 
Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 746; Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 304 
(noting in dicta that "any limitation on access to 
intercollegiate sports is merely the incidental result of the 
organization's pursuit of its legitimate goals"); see also 
Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F. Supp. 
356, 379 (D. Ariz. 1983) (holding that NCAA sanctions such 
as rendering a college team ineligible for post-season play 
and for television appearances imposed for violations of rule 
against providing compensation to student-athletes did not 
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violate antitrust law because sanctions were reasonably 
related to the NCAA's goals of preserving amateurism and 
promoting fair competition). 
 
We agree with these courts that, in general, the NCAA's 
eligibility rules allow for the survival of the product, 
amateur sports, and allow for an even playing field. See 
McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1345. Likewise, the bylaw at issue 
here is a reasonable restraint which furthers the NCAA's 
goal of fair competition and the survival of intercollegiate 
athletics and is thus procompetitive. Clearly, the rule 
discourages institutions with graduate or professional 
schools from inducing undergraduates at other institutions 
to forgo participating in the athletic programs at their 
undergraduate institutions in order to preserve eligibility 
to participate in intercollegiate athletics on a 
postbaccalaureate basis. Likewise, the rule discourages 
undergraduates from forgoing participation in athletic 
programs on their own initiative to preserve eligibility on a 
postbaccalaureate basis at another institution. Indeed, we 
think that the bylaw so clearly survives a rule of reason 
analysis that we do not hesitate upholding it by affirming 
an order granting a motion to dismiss Smith's antitrust 
count for failure to state a claim on which relief can be 
granted. 
 
B. TITLE IX CLAIM 
 
Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participating in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. S 1681(a). Intercollegiate 
athletics is an educational program or activity within the 
statute. See 20 U.S.C. S 1687; 34 C.F.R. S 106.41 (a).5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The statute defines "program or activity" as 
 
       (2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, 
or a 
       public system of higher education; or . . . 
 
       (4) any other entity which is established by two or more of the 
       entities described in paragraph (1) (2), or (3); 
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Thus, the NCAA is subject to Title IX provided that it 
receives federal financial assistance within the meaning of 
section 1681(a). 
 
Federal regulations define "recipient" as including 
 
       any public or private agency, institution or 
       organization, or other entity, or any other person, to 
       whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly 
       or through another recipient and which operates an 
       educational program or activity which receives or 
       benefits from such assistance, including any subunit, 
       successor, assignee or transferee thereof. 
 
34 C.F.R. S 106.2(h) (1997) (emphasis added). The plain 
language of the statute and regulation is quite broad and 
encompasses indirect recipients of federal funds. See Grove 
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 564, 104 S.Ct. 1211, 
1216 (1984) (holding that a college received federal funds 
where the funds were granted to its students asfinancial 
aid rather than directly to the college because the language 
of the section does not distinguish between direct and 
indirect receipt of federal funds). 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the 
applicability of Title IX to a state high school athletic 
association in Horner v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 
43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994). In Horner, the plaintiffs, female 
student-athletes, alleged that the association received dues 
from its member high schools, many of which receive 
federal funds, and that a state statute authorized the 
designation of the association as an agent of the state 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance . . . . 
 
20 U.S.C. S 1687. In addition, federal regulation in part provides that 
 
       [n]o person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation 
       in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another 
       person or otherwise be discriminated against in any 
interscholastic, 
       intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a 
recipient, 
       and no recipient shall provide any such athletics separately on 
such 
       basis. 
 
34 C.F.R. S 106.41(a). 
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board of education. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 156.070(1), 
(2). In that capacity, the association performed the board's 
statutory duties with respect to interscholastic sports. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the association violated Title IX by 
sanctioning fewer sports for girls than boys and by refusing 
to sanction a particular sport for girls. The court held that 
the association would be subject to Title IX if the plaintiff 
could prove her allegations with respect to its functioning 
and financing. See id. 
 
The district court attempted to distinguish Horner by 
noting that "even if the [NCAA] receives dues from member 
schools which receive federal funds, unlike the situation in 
Horner, there is no statutory connection between the 
parties such that the Defendant can be considered the 
`agent' of its member institutions that receive federal 
financial assistance." See Smith, 978 F. Supp. at 220. Thus, 
according to the district court, the distinguishing 
characteristic here is the lack of statutory authority for the 
NCAA. We disagree. The NCAA acts no less than the 
association in Horner as an agent of its member institutions 
merely because it lacks statutory authority for its activities. 
The NCAA is a voluntary organization created by and 
comprised of the educational institutions which essentially 
acts as their surrogate with respect to athletic rules. 
 
In its construction of section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act, which contains language identical to that of Title IX in 
20 U.S.C. S 1681(a) regarding receipt of federal assistance,6 
the Supreme Court has indicated that Congress, as in Title 
IX, did not distinguish between direct and indirectfinancial 
assistance. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed 
Veterans of Amer., 477 U.S. 597, 606-07, 106 S.Ct. 2705, 
2711-12 (1986) (citing Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 564, 
104 S.Ct. at 1216 (holding that a college received federal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Rehabilitation Act states that 
 
       [n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United 
       States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely 
by 
       reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation 
in, 
       be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
       any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 794 (emphasis added). 
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funds where the funds were granted to its students as 
financial aid rather than directly to the college)). The Court, 
however, drew a distinction between those entities which 
indirectly benefit from federal assistance and those that 
indirectly receive federal assistance, holding that only those 
the receive federal funds are within the statute. Thus, the 
Court rejected the argument that all commercial airlines 
are "recipients" of federal funds simply because airport 
operators receive federal funds which benefit the airlines in 
the form of runways, inter alia. See id. at 606, 106 S.Ct. at 
2711. The Court defined "recipient" from a contractual 
perspective, limiting "recipients" of federal funds, and 
therefore the obligations of the act, to those who are in a 
position to decide whether to "receive" federal funds and 
thereby accept the concomitant obligations of the statute. 
See id.7 
 
Notwithstanding the parallel language of the 
Rehabilitation Act and Title IX, we do not apply the 
Paralyzed Veterans Court's definition of "recipient" to Title 
IX in the circumstances here. In our view, the broad 
regulatory language under Title IX, which defines a 
recipient as an entity "which operates an educational 
program or activity which receives or benefits" from federal 
funds, 34 C.F.R. S 106.2(h) (1997) (emphasis added), 
requires that we reach a different result. Application of 
Paralyzed Veterans here would render the regulatory 
definition of "recipient" under Title IX a nullity. After all, 
unlike the commercial airlines in Paralyzed Veterans, the 
NCAA is not merely an incidental beneficiary of federal 
funds. Quite to the contrary, it seems to us that the 
relationship between the members of the NCAA and the 
organization itself is qualitatively different than that 
between airlines and airport operators, for we think that it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Court noted that "Congress enters into an arrangement in the 
nature of a contract with the recipients of the[federal] funds: the 
recipient's acceptance of the funds triggers coverage under the 
nondiscrimination provision." 477 U.S. at 605, 106 S.Ct. at 2711. The 
Court further noted that "[b]y limiting coverage to recipients, Congress 
imposes the obligations of S 504 upon those who are in a position to 
accept or reject those obligations as a part of the decision whether or 
not 
to `receive' federal funds." Id. at 606, 106 S.Ct. at 2711. 
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would be unreasonable to characterize the latter as 
surrogates for the airlines. Given the breadth of the 
language of the Title IX regulation defining recipient, we 
hold that allegations in Smith's proposed amended 
complaint, that the NCAA receives dues from its members 
which receive federal funds, if proven, would subject the 
NCAA to the requirements of Title IX. 
 
The district court found that Smith's original complaint 
did not allege that the NCAA was a recipient of federal 
funds, and therefore dismissed the Title IX claim. See 
Smith, 978 F. Supp. at 219. Smith's complaint included the 
following allegation: 
 
       This action is a request for declaratory relief 
       challenging sex discriminatory practices and policies of 
       the NCAA, Hofstra University, and the University of 
       Pittsburgh in violation of Title IX of the Educational 
       Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. S 1681. Title IX 
       prohibits sex discrimination in an educational program 
       or activity receiving federal financial assistance. 
 
Compl. P 25. We agree that Smith's original complaint did 
not contain an allegation that the NCAA receives federal 
financial assistance. Thus, the district court properly 
dismissed her original Title IX complaint.8 
 
But we have not confined our analysis to Smith's original 
complaint for, as we have indicated, following the district 
court's dismissal of her claims, Smith moved for leave to 
amend her complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. By 
order dated June 5, 1997, the district court denied this 
motion, stating only that the motion "is denied as moot, the 
court having granted defendant's motion to dismiss on May 
20, 1997." App. at 117. Because the district court gave no 
further explanation, it is unclear whether the district court 
was unaware of its discretion to allow the proposed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. However, Judge McKee would hold that Smith's original complaint 
sufficiently states that the NCAA receives federalfinancial assistance 
under the pleading requirements that we apply to pro se complaints. See 
Zillich v. Lucht, 981 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1992) ("When, as in this case, 
plaintiff is a pro se litigant, we have a special obligation to construe 
[her] 
complaint liberally."). 
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amended complaint despite the dismissal or whether the 
court believed that the amendment would be futile even if 
pleaded. Nevertheless, under either view, the district court 
erred in denying Smith's motion for leave to amend. 
 
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), a plaintiff has an 
absolute right to amend her complaint once at any time 
before a responsive pleading is served. Thereafter, a plaintiff 
must seek leave of the district court to amend her pleading, 
and although it is within the district court's discretion, 
district courts should grant such requests freely when 
justice so requires. Id. 
 
After the district court enters judgment on a motion to 
dismiss, a plaintiff no longer may amend her complaint as 
of right. See Newark Branch, NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 
907 F.2d 1408, 1417 (3d Cir. 1990); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 
F.2d 1270, 1276 (3d Cir. 1970). However, even though 
Smith no longer was entitled to amend her complaint as of 
right after the dismissal of her claim, it was within the 
district court's discretion to grant her leave to amend. See 
Newark Branch, NAACP, 907 F.2d at 1417; Kauffman, 420 
F.2d at 1276; In re Sverica Acquisition Corp. v. Load Rite 
Trailers, Inc., 179 B.R. 457, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Fearon v. 
Community Fed. Sav. & Loan of Phila., 119 F.R.D. 13, 15 
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (plaintiff had no right to amend where both 
complaint and action dismissed, but could seek leave of 
court to do so). Thus, her motion to amend was not moot 
in the sense of being too late or being foreclosed by the 
dismissal. 
 
While "the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is 
within the discretion of the District Court . . . outright 
refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason 
appearing for the denial is not an exercise of that 
discretion; it is merely an abuse of that discretion and 
inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules." Foman v. 
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230 (1962). On the 
other hand, a district court justifiably may deny leave to 
amend on grounds such as undue delay, bad faith, dilatory 
motive, and prejudice, as well as on the ground that an 
amendment would be futile. See id.; In re Burlington Coat 
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1434; Massarsky v. General 
Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 125 (3d Cir. 1983). An 
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amendment is futile if the complaint, as amended, would 
not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. See In re Burlington 
Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1434 (citing Glassman v. 
Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir. 1996)). In 
determining whether the amendment would be futile, the 
district court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency 
as under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See id. 
 
Smith alleged facts in her proposed amended complaint 
which, if proven, would establish that the NCAA was a 
recipient of federal funds within the meaning of Title IX. 
Her motion states that she intended the amended 
complaint to cure any allegational defects, and the 
proposed amended complaint includes an allegation that 
the NCAA is an indirect recipient of federal funds. In 
particular, her proposed amended complaint alleges that 
"[t]he NCAA is a recipient of federal funds because it is an 
entity which receives federal financial assistance through 
another recipient and operates an educational program or 
activity which receives or benefits from such assistance." 
App. at 98. This allegation plainly alleges that the NCAA 
receives dues from member institutions, which receive 
federal funds. As discussed above, this allegation would be 
sufficient to bring the NCAA within the scope of Title IX as 
a recipient of federal funds and would survive a motion to 
dismiss. 
 
If a district court concludes that an amendment is futile 
based upon its erroneous view of the law, it abuses its 
discretion in denying a plaintiff leave to amend to include 
a legally sufficient allegation. See Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 
1422, 1431 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that the district court, 
which erred in its conclusion that there was jurisdictional 
defect, abused its discretion in denying a plaintiff's motion 
for leave to amend his complaint because the proposed 
amendment would not cure the jurisdictional defect). Thus, 
if the district court denied Smith leave to amend because it 
viewed the proposed amendments as futile, it erred because 
the conclusion was based on an error of law. Furthermore, 
we see no basis to conclude that the district court 
justifiably could have denied the motion to amend on the 
grounds that Smith had acted in bad faith, with a dilatory 
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motive, or had delayed unduly in bringing the motion or 
that granting the motion would prejudice the NCAA. Indeed, 
there is nothing in the record to support a conclusion that 
the district court denied the motion to amend on any of 
these grounds. Overall, therefore, we are satisfied that the 
district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to 
amend the complaint.9 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's dismissal of appellant's Sherman Act claim, vacate 
its dismissal of the Title IX claim, and reverse the district 
court's denial of her motion for leave to amend her 
complaint with respect to her Title IX claim. In light of this 
conclusion, we will remand to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion and direct the 
district court to reinstate her state law contract claim, over 
which the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c). The parties will bear their 
own costs on this appeal. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We do not imply that we have any view of the merits of Smith's Title 
IX claim. The parties have not briefed the merits, and the district court 
will address those issues on remand if Smith can prove her allegations 
to support the applicability of Title IX to the NCAA. Thus, we emphasize 
that we merely hold that the amendment would not have been futile in 
the sense that it would not have pled adequately that the NCAA was 
subject to Title IX.                                 
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